Savings and fake bond scams: how they work and how to get money back

A fake savings bond scam is an investment scam dressed up as a savings account. Fraudsters copy the name, website and paperwork of a genuine bank, building society or savings brand, advertise a bond with an attractive rate, and persuade you to transfer money to an account they control. Investment scams are one of the scam types listed by Take Five, the national anti-fraud campaign, alongside impersonation scams, banking fraud and many others¹.

The consequences are not always a total loss. Since 7 October 2024, banks and other payment firms have had to reimburse victims of authorised push payment (APP) scams in most cases, up to a maximum that most guidance puts at £85,000, with the refund normally paid within five business days of the claim². The bank can deduct an excess of up to £100, and there is a reporting deadline: the fraud must be reported no more than 13 months after the last fraudulent payment³. This page explains how these scams work, how to check an offer is genuine, and how the refund rules operate if money has already gone.

How fake savings bond scams work

The scam usually begins with contact that looks official: an advert, an email, a phone call or a website that appears to belong to a real savings provider. The fraudster clones the brand, sometimes down to the logo, the product names and the wording of the terms. Genuine fixed-rate savings bonds are a real and ordinary product: MoneyHelper notes that with these accounts the minimum deposit is usually £100, with a maximum typically of £1,000,000, and that your money is locked away for a set term⁵. A scam offer copies that shape, promising a fixed return over one, three or five years, and asks for a bank transfer to "open" the bond.

The transfer is the point of the whole exercise. Once you authorise a payment to an account the fraudster controls, the money moves quickly and the "bond" never existed. NS&I, the government-backed savings provider, warns customers about exactly this kind of impersonation and sets out its own security promise so savers can tell genuine contact from fake⁶. NS&I's genuine products have concrete minimums you can check against any offer: Income Bonds require deposits of at least £500 from a UK bank account in your own name⁷.

Cloning does not only affect savings brands. Which? reports that fraudsters impersonate genuine solicitors or conveyancing firms to steal money during the house buying process, and that sometimes the fraudster will hack into a solicitor's or buyer's email account, impersonate the solicitor and then provide alternative bank details for deposits to be paid to⁸. The same technique works on savers: an email that appears to come from a provider you already save with, giving "new" account details for a top-up or a maturing bond rollover.

Caller identity is not proof of anything either. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) warns that it is possible for a scammer to use a fake caller ID to make it look as though they are calling from FSCS, and that it has seen a rise in this sort of scam⁹. A phone number matching the one printed on a genuine website does not mean the call is genuine, because the displayed number can be spoofed.

Warning signs of a fake bond offer

The warning signs are consistent across official guidance, and they mostly come down to pressure and contact you did not initiate. Take Five lists the common warning signs as unexpected contact, pressure to act quickly, requests for personal or security information, offers that seem too good to be true, and payment details that suddenly change¹. The last one matters especially for savers who already hold a bond: a message saying the provider has changed its account, and asking you to send maturity money to a new sort code, is a classic pattern.

The consumer guidance for Northern Ireland sets out signs that should set alarm bells ringing whenever you see them: something which sounds too good to be true normally is; being contacted unexpectedly; being asked for personal or bank information; not being given long to make a decision or feeling pressured; being asked to pay up-front with only a mobile number and PO box as contact details; being called repeatedly and kept on the phone a long time; and being asked to keep quiet¹⁰. The request for secrecy is a significant one, because a genuine savings provider has no reason to ask you not to discuss your finances with anyone.

The same patterns appear in pension and investment fraud, which often targets the same savers. The Pensions Regulator's warning signs are unexpected offers, promises of early access to pensions, or guaranteed high returns¹¹. FSCS makes the same point about pensions: if you are contacted out of the blue about a pension opportunity, chances are it is high risk or a scam¹². A "guaranteed" return on a savings product is a contradiction in terms, since even genuine fixed-rate bonds carry the risk that the provider fails, which is what FSCS protection exists for.

Some scams move from a savings pitch to direct requests for security details. Age UK describes bank scam calls where scammers might ask you for your PIN and tell you to give your bank card to a courier¹³. No genuine bank or savings provider will ever do this. FSCS research has suggested that more than five million savers could fall for one of the most common scam tactics¹⁴, so being caught out is not a sign of foolishness; these approaches are designed to work.

Stop, Challenge, Protect: the Take Five checks

Take Five is a national campaign led by HM Government and UK Finance and backed by major banks and building societies⁶. Its core advice is a three-step routine for any unexpected approach, and it is worth applying it to every savings offer that arrives out of the blue, however convincing the paperwork.

The first step is to stop: take a moment to stop and think before parting with your money or information, because it could keep you safe¹. The second is to challenge: ask yourself, could it be fake? Take Five is explicit that it is ok to reject, refuse or ignore any requests, and that only criminals will try to rush or panic you¹. The third is to protect: contact your bank immediately if money or account details are involved, and report the scam to the police at reportfraud.police.uk or by calling 0300 123 2040¹.

Two practical checks follow from this. First, avoid clicking links in unexpected emails, texts or social media messages; go directly to the organisation's official website or app using details you trust¹. Second, verify the firm independently. A genuine savings provider will be on the Financial Conduct Authority register, and you can find it by searching yourself rather than using any link or number the offer gives you. If the offer names a real provider, call that provider on the number from its own website and ask whether the bond exists.

What to do straight away if you have paid

Speed matters more than anything else at this stage. The Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) states that as soon as you realise you have fallen victim to a scam, contact your bank immediately to report it¹⁶. The bank may still be able to recall the payment, freeze the receiving account or warn the receiving bank, and every hour makes that less likely. The PSR also recommends contacting Action Fraud to make a report, particularly if you think you have already been a victim, and notes that fraudsters even pose as PSR employees, so any call claiming to be from a regulator deserves the same caution¹⁷.

FSCS gives the same advice from the compensation side: speak to your bank, building society or credit union, as they can protect and reimburse victims of certain types of fraud, and report to Action Fraud at www.actionfraud.police.uk⁹. The national reporting service is now called Report Fraud, and you can contact it at reportfraud.police.uk or on 0300 123 2040¹⁸. Government guidance on suspicious calls and messages says the same: report it to Report Fraud or telephone 0300 123 2040¹⁹.

The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) sets out the immediate steps in order: contact your bank or payment services provider immediately, contact the police on 101, report the scam to Report Fraud, and keep records of all contact and correspondence between you and the scammer²⁰. Those records, emails, texts, adverts and payment references, are what your bank and any later complaint will rely on. The Information Commissioner's Office, which handles nuisance calls and messages, also refers complaints about fraud and scams to Report Fraud²¹.

Where you report depends on where you are. You can contact Report Fraud about fraud in England, Wales or Northern Ireland; if you live in Scotland or the fraud happened there, contact Police Scotland on 101²².

APP scam refunds: how banks pay back scam victims

When you are tricked into making a payment yourself, it is called an authorised push payment scam, and since October 2024 there have been mandatory refund rules. The PSR's policy statement required payment firms to reimburse all in-scope customers who fall victim to APP fraud in most cases, with the new reimbursement requirement coming into force in 2024²³. The rules apply to payments made on or after 7 October 2024⁴. The PSR's work on APP scams aims for consistent minimum standards, with most APP fraud victims being reimbursed within five business days²⁴.

The rules were built on earlier consultation. The PSR's 2022 consultation concluded that responsibility for allowing fraudulent payments is the responsibility of both the sending and receiving banks or building societies, and proposed requiring reimbursement in all but exceptional cases, so more victims get their money back²⁵. The final requirement shares the cost of reimbursing victims 50:50 between sending and receiving payment firms²³, which gives the banks that receive money for scammers a direct financial reason to police their own customers. The PSR has also proposed directing banks and other payment firms participating in CHAPS to reimburse their customers who have been victims of APP scams²⁶, closing a gap for large same-day payments.

Who is eligible matters. The rules cover payments from personal bank accounts and payments made by micro-enterprises and certain charities, for payments made using Faster Payments⁴. The Financial Ombudsman Service describes the outcome: the rules require banks and other payment service providers to reimburse you up to a maximum of £85,000 if you are the victim of an APP scam²⁷. The scale of the problem is visible in complaint numbers: in the first quarter of 2025/26, around half of fraud and scams complaints to the ombudsman, some 3,400, were about authorised push payment scams²⁸.

Refund limit: up to £85,000 per scam

The maximum amount the bank has to pay is currently £85,000, according to debt advice guidance on the refund rules³, and the same £85,000 cap appears in the ombudsman's description of the rules²⁷ and in the PSR's reimbursement data, which counts the value of APP scams above the maximum cap of £85,000³⁰. Take Five's guidance states the maximum amount of money you can claim under the rules is £85,000⁴.

The £85,000 figure is the one the official sources give. The Payment Systems Regulator's own rules set a maximum reimbursement of £85,000 for Faster Payments and CHAPS claims³, and its data publications use the same cap, alongside a £100 excess³⁰. Banks state the same limit: Chase, for example, tells customers the maximum it will refund is £85,000 per claim, subject to review by regulators and possible change. If a bank quotes a different cap, it is worth asking it to state which version of the rules it is applying and checking that with the Financial Ombudsman Service.

Two further points shape what a refund is actually worth. The cap applies per scam claim, and the bank may deduct an excess of up to £100 for each scam claim²⁷. And the cap is a maximum the bank has to pay, not a guaranteed amount: the bank assesses the claim first, and can refuse in the limited circumstances described later in this page.

Payments the refund rules do not cover

The rules have boundaries, and knowing them explains why some victims get nothing back. The most important is territory: the rules cover payments made within the UK, and a payment sent overseas is not covered⁴. The payment must also have been sent from a bank in the UK to another bank in the UK². Many fake bond scams involve accounts at UK banks, even when the fraudsters are abroad, but a transfer to a foreign account falls outside the mandatory refund.

The rules also only cover certain payment systems. Take Five's guidance lists payments made using Faster Payments⁴, and the CHAPS reimbursement requirement was still at proposal stage in the PSR's consultation²⁶. Card payments, cheques and cash work differently: the ombudsman handles complaints about cheques and bankers' drafts, including cases where a banker's draft turned out to be fake or went missing and the bank would not refund you³¹.

FSCS protection does not fill these gaps. FSCS states that in most situations it cannot compensate people for money lost due to scams or fraud, except where bad advice came from an authorised financial adviser to invest in something that turns out to be a scam, and that as it is not an enforcement agency it cannot take any steps against suspected scammers⁹. The ombudsman's approach to savings and investments complaints is about whether a product was suitable, not about recovering money paid to a fraudster³².

There is also a legal edge case. Under regulation 76 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017, the usual refund deadline does not apply where the payment provider has reasonable grounds to suspect fraudulent behaviour by the payment service user and notifies a person mentioned in section 333A(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of those grounds in writing³³. In plain terms, if the bank suspects the customer was complicit, the normal protections fall away.

Online protections are limited too. The Online Safety Bill does not cover fraud via advertising, emails or cloned websites³⁴, which is precisely where many fake bond offers live. Checking an offer yourself, rather than relying on platforms to filter it out, remains the main defence.

What you are expected to do: caution, warnings and the £100 excess

The refund rules are not unconditional. They assume a baseline of ordinary caution from the customer, and the bank can refuse a refund in defined circumstances. Debt advice guidance lists the grounds: the bank can refuse if it can prove that you authorised the payments, if it can prove you were at fault because you acted fraudulently or negligently, or if you told them about the fraud 13 months or more after the payment was taken³. The 13-month deadline is the one that catches people who discover a scam late, perhaps when a bond was supposed to mature, so the reporting rule bears repeating: the fraud must be reported as soon as you can, and no more than 13 months after the last fraudulent payment was made⁴.

The £100 excess is the other condition. Your bank can deduct £100 from the refund it gives you unless you are considered vulnerable under the rules², and the ombudsman confirms the bank may deduct an excess of up to £100 for each scam claim²⁷. Some banks choose not to apply it, but they are permitted to. For a small payment, the excess can swallow most of the loss; for a large one, it is a minor deduction.

Warnings given before the payment also matter. The rules expect banks to have effective warnings, and a customer who ignored a clear and specific warning from their bank at the time of the transfer may find the bank argues they were grossly negligent. This is why the bank's own app prompts, "are you sure you know this person" style messages, are worth reading rather than clicking through: they form part of the record of what you were told.

If you are vulnerable to the scam

Vulnerability changes what the bank must do. The ombudsman's guidance is blunt: if the rules apply and you were particularly vulnerable to the specific type of APP scam, your bank or payment service provider must reimburse you²⁷. The £100 excess also cannot be applied if you are considered vulnerable under the rules³. Vulnerability in this context is not only age or ill health; it includes circumstances that made you especially susceptible to the particular manipulation used, such as a scammer impersonating your own bank during a period of financial stress.

Older savers are heavily targeted. FSCS has warned that scammers bombard people aged 55 and over with bogus investment opportunities to try to get hold of their pension savings³⁶, and its research suggested more than five million savers could fall for one of the most common scam tactics¹⁴. The Pensions Regulator's campaign material makes the same point about unexpected offers and guaranteed high returns¹¹. If you are helping a parent or friend manage savings, the checks in this page apply doubly to offers that reach them by phone or post.

If you believe you were vulnerable when the payment was made, say so in your claim and in any complaint, and give the bank the evidence: medical circumstances, a recent bereavement, a diagnosis, or the specific pressure the fraudster applied. The bank is required to take it into account, and the ombudsman will test whether it did.

When your bank says no: complaining about the decision

A refusal is not the end. The first step is to complain to the bank itself, using its formal complaints process, and to say you want the decision reviewed against the APP reimbursement rules. If the bank still says no, or eight weeks pass without a final answer, you can take the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service, which can order the bank to refund the money.

The ombudsman's case studies show what it looks for. In Nadia's case, the bank refused to refund £100,000 she was persuaded to send to a fraudster, saying it would not refund the money because she had authorised the payments herself³⁷. Authorisation by the victim is the whole point of an APP scam, so the ombudsman examines whether the bank did enough: in Joyce's case, it established that the bank had not asked sufficient questions about the transactions, and if it had, the scam would not have been successful³⁵. Joyce had been transferring money to an unregulated broker, and the bank's failure to probe the payments decided the case against it³⁵.

Not every complaint succeeds. In Evan's case, the ombudsman did not uphold the complaint because it believed the bank was blocking the payments to protect his interests³⁸. The ombudsman also publishes complaint volumes by product: in the first quarter of 2026/27 there were 58 complaints about savings certificates or bonds³⁹, a reminder that disputes about savings products, including mis-selling and suitability, are a recognised category it handles³².

Complaints about scam losses are a large and growing share of the ombudsman's fraud work: 3,400 APP scam complaints in a single quarter²⁸. When you complain, include the advert or message that started it, the payment details, the dates, and anything showing what the bank said or asked at the time. The ombudsman's decision is free to the consumer and binding on the bank if you accept it.

For free, impartial help at any stage, MoneyHelper and the debt advice charities behind the refund guidance offer support, and the ombudsman itself will explain how to bring a complaint. If you want to understand how genuine savings products work before comparing any offer, see types of savings account, fixed-rate bonds and fixed-term savings, and how FSCS protection works for savings.